Technology is a process of organizing inputs to achieve specified outcomes, but to most people technology is synonymous with hardware-the artificial kidney, electronic monitoring, computerized tomography (CT), nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR), and lithotripters. This common confusion is symptomatic of the difficulties we face in mobilizing the vast resources we expend on health care toward the design of an effective, affordable, and equitable framework of care for all Americans.
rewards thoughtful decision making, sensitive communication, and efforts to educate and promote health. Recent work on a resource-based relative-value scale for physician payment by Hsiao and his colleagues (1988) indicates that one of the most undervalued services is an initial office visit by a healthy adult to an internist. In this extreme case, the mean Medicare charge relative to the resource-based relative value was 18 percent. The comparable figures for insertion of a pacemaker or for repair of an inguinal hernia were 232 percent and 154 percent. As Hsiao and his associates note, &dquo;invasive procedures are typically compensated at more than double the rate of evaluation and management services, when both consume the same resource inputs&dquo; (p. 881). We also see that neonatal hardware captures the imagination of both professionals and the public far more than the seemingly routine and mundane efforts to oversee healthy development, monitor risks among pregnant women, or ensure that children are properly immunized. And we know that efforts to implant devices in the elderly or image the brain of schizophrenics seem far more exciting than organizing the complex social resources and financing arrangements essential to long-term community care that sustain function and quality of life for the elderly, the seriously mentally ill, and other populations.
Noting these tendencies (some would say aberrations) in no way diminishes the extraordinary advances thus far in biomedical science and technology or those advances yet to come. Nor do I seek to minimize the enormous value and comfort some new technical advances represent (e.g., hip replacements that allow new mobility, implantation of intraocular lenses that facilitate sight, NMR imaging that substitutes for invasive and more dangerous interventions) or the exciting innovations on the horizon. The extraordinary success of so much new hardware, and the potential of new techniques and drugs, excites the imagination of the public as well as the enthusiasm of scientists and health professionals. Surveys of the public persistently show strong support for continued investment in medical technology, and the unequivocal evidence of its successes sets the context for confusion in our values and distortions in our priorities.
In large part because of this record of success, tolerance for the use of new hardware is extraordinarily wide, even in the absence of effectiveness or in the presence of more compelling and competing priorities. Such simple and natural functions as having a baby, for example, have been technically elaborated to a point, even in normal circumstances, that raises questions about our wisdom. For example, electronic fetal heart rate monitoring, first introduced commercially in 1969, is now routinely used in most pregnancies. Initially, uncontrolled studies suggested some value in such monitoring but, subsequently, eight randomized controlled trials found no support for such claims (Shy, Larson, and Luthy 1987) . There may be some small possibility of fewer neonatal seizures, but monitoring leads to exaggerated assessments of fetal distress and may result in increased cesarean sections and forceps deliveries. Typically, young physicians and nurses are no longer taught traditional auscultation, leading to total dependence on instruments for electronic monitoring, and new practitioners have little experience in acquiring basic clinical skills, a particular problem for those from developing nations trained in the United States. Similarly, the claims for electrocardiographic monitoring and the expensive development of intensive coronary care have not been supported by several randomized clinical trials (Waitzkin 1979) . The circumstances surrounding electronic monitoring of internal organs apply as well to many other commonly used technologies.
A wide range of factors sustain an emphasis on technical procedures even when the procedures are uncertain and ineffective, accounting in part for the enormous variations across practice areas. Clinicians are more guided by their experiences than by abstract studies and often feel confident on the basis of particular instances when the procedures used have been helpful. Our systems of payment typically make it economically rewarding to use sophisticated equipment and procedures in instances of uncertainty. Further, increasing awareness stimulated by mass media coverage of new procedures and hardware commonly brings patients to medical settings convinced of the value of new technical approaches. The failure to use such technologies, even when unwarranted by the scientific literature, may put physicians and hospitals at risk of malpractice litigation. Moreover, once these technologies are introduced, there is strong incentive for maintaining their use-for both the medical manufacturers and the professionals who use the products. Thus, we have woven a pattem of interests and incentives that makes it difficult to forgo technical hardware and procedures in instances of uncertainty.
On the other side of the argument are incredible gaps in access to care. Despite enormous expenditures, 37 million people remain uninsured and many more are underinsured. Such fundamental services as prenatal care, early child care, and immunization are commonly inaccessible to the poor. Services for the chronically mentally ill, substance abusers, and people with AIDS are underfinanced, fragmented, and often unavailable. In every large city in the nation, and in many small communities as well, the tragedy of neglect is apparent. Caring for these populations in need requires complex financial and organizational approaches, but their development and maintenance are not supported by the types of incentives and interests that sustain the technical procedures characteristic of medicine and surgery. ' The failures are not in our understanding, our lack of awareness of the problems and challenges, or even our sympathies. There is no lack of analysis, exhortations to do better, or expressions of concern. The problem is rooted in the difficulties of modifying prior commitments and in the need to proceed incrementally by augmenting already large commitments to the health sector. The entrenchment of stakeholders in current distributional patterns makes it exceedingly difficult to have a meaningful public discussion of trade-offs. Whenever major advances are made in implementing health priorities here and abroad, as they were in the 1960s with Medicare and Medicaid, and most recently in Massachusetts with new legislation covering the uninsured (Sager 1988) , they were achieved with the promise of large new infusions of funds for established providers. Attempting to do this nationally in our present context of economic constraint and projected difficulties with budget deficits impresses many as a formidable-some would say impossible-undertaking.
Whether the United States could or should increase investments in health care to 12, 13, or even 15 percent of the gross national product is a political question and can only be resolved in that arena. In the absence of large new health investment, if we are to modify priorities-giving more emphasis to social and organizational technologies, education, and prevention-we must significantly restructure our ways of financing and organizing medical services. The inescapable conclusion-and one that has been with us for some time-is that we must have a controllable prospective budget and break away from reimbursement systems that pay for each service and procedure.
Despite much background noise, this change in focus has been widely appreciated, as evidenced by the efforts to develop health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs), and the introduction of prospective payment for hospitals in the Medicare program. Indeed, efforts are now underway to extend similar devices to nursing homes and to some types of physician payment. Clearly, we are attempting to do by increments what we seem unable to do in a single stroke because of the complex alignments of health interests. We always pay, and we will continue to pay, a heavy price for our halfway measures. Our talented providers have a striking capacity to understand the incentives and &dquo;game the system&dquo;; they are adept and adaptive. Consider the emergence of surgicenters and the speed with which surgery, long rooted in hospital care, was transferred to outpatient settings, or the capacity of hospitals to reduce lengths of stay substantially, across a broad range of diagnoses-but particularly among the elderly.
Even the HMO sector, which was experiencing sluggish growth in the 1970s, expanded rapidly in the 1980s as competition for patients increased. But inadequate regulation of the competition did lead to a good bit of selective marketing, risk avoidance, and cutbacks in coverage affecting the seriously chronically ill. The HMO sector is now far more heterogeneous in organization and quality of care, as perhaps it must be. The virtual elimination of community rating, however, and the increasing differentiation of risk pools, has destroyed an important idea of social insurance, the idea of sharing risks across a community.
There is little doubt, given the expensive potential of emerging science and technology and concern about expenditures in both public and private sectors, that medical care will be rationed more obviously in the future. Moreover, the focus of rationing tensions will be less on issues of ability to pay, a long-standing limiting factor, and more on purposive decisions. The state of Oregon recently decided, for example, not to provide payment for transplantation in its Medicaid program, maintaining that the use of scarce funds for other needs would be more effective (Welch and Larson 1988) . The difficulty Oregon has had in sustaining its well-considered decision reflects the enormous difficulties of withholding any useful technology. But public and private programs will be making tougher coverage decisions. The recent decision of Medicare not to pay for tissue plasminogen activator (TPA), which costs approximately ten times as much as streptokinase, has infuriated some physicians who complain of government control over clinical decision making, but such decisions will become relatively common in cases where little evidence exists to support a more expensive approach as clearly advantageous over less costly alternatives.
There are a number of ways to ration care and, thus, much uncertainty about how rationing strategies will evolve (Mechanic 1986). In recent years, coinsurance and deductibles have increased but the range of insurance benefits has continued to expand (Short 1988 ). It seems unlikely, given public views and preferences, that extensive cost shifting to consumers will be a politically viable strategy. Moreover, while the RAND Health Insurance Experiment found that cost sharing reduced utilization, it did not do so in a well-targeted way and it limited appropriate care as well as care of uncertain value (Lohr et al. 1986 ). Moreover, cost-sharing was associated with health decrements among the sick poor (Brook et al. 1983 ).
Government must resolve, either through conscious decision or by muddling through, the degree to which it will establish constraints directly and explicitly and the amount of discretion to pass on to decentralized providers. Such providers could establish a rationing process within the economic constraints of partial or complete capitation, as in the instances of the prospective payment system (PPS) on the one hand and HMO capitation on the other. Government has enormous data gathering and analytic capacities and can draw on a broad scientific data base to make allocative decisions. But policymakers are also far removed from the complexities and contingencies of caring for seriously ill people, and government decisions so broadly executed will be subject to intense political debate at each step and to many judgment errors as these decisions affect individual instances.
The alternative is establishment of a general regulatory framework through capitation that allows provider organizations the discretion to respond to the heterogeneous needs of the populations they serve. As with prospective hospital reimbursement, government would set the level of payment but would not prescribe how care is given. It remains unclear to what extent public expectations and political pressure will require government interventions beyond what capitation approaches require. In PPS, for example, widely publicized claims that patients are being discharged &dquo;quicker but sicker&dquo; have led the Health Care Financing Administration to monitor readmissions and effectiveness-of-care issues in a way that would have seemed quite radical just a few years ago. As poor management and other abuses have become evident in the rapidly expanding HMO arena, and specifically with regard to Medicare patients, there is growing momentum to require a level of detailed reporting that diminishes some of the flexibility associated with capitation payment. A major potential of capitation lies in its ability to reduce the enormous administrative infrastructure necessary for maintaining and regulating a fee-for-service system. But if we unnecessarily encumber it with onerous regulation, we lose a significant part of its advantages. At present, enormous administrative costs are necessary to maintain the highly regulated, service-driven payment system we have. Between 1970 and 1982, total health care personnel increased by 57 percent but administrative personnel grew by 171 (Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1986) . A lot of these administrative resources could be applied more usefully.
As interest focuses more intensely on rationing, limiting the availability of expensive technologies such as liver transplants or limiting access to technology by age is increasingly being advocated. Daniel Callahan, for example, has provoked considerable debate by arguing that society must place limits &dquo;on the length of individual lives that a society can sensibly be expected to maintain at public cost&dquo; (Callahan 1986, 266) . Beyond the moral implications-and there are serious ones when ascriptive categories are used as opposed to facts about individual cases in making life and death decisions-it seems unlikely that an approach based on age boundaries rather than medical facts could gain public acceptance if addressed explicitly in public discussion. Experience suggests that the technological imperative is still strong, and that extending new techniques has wide support among physicians and the greater public. Recent extensions of coverage for heart transplantation suggest the dynamics involved. Physicians and the public appreciate the fact that technologies widely accepted today were once more costly and less effective, and are reluctant to modify their hopes of still better futures.
There are those who believe that the chances of modifying priorities are much better at the level where research and development (R & D) investment is targeted than at the point where therapies become clinically applicable. They argue that we should not invest in researching new technologies that primarily extend old age and debility because such technologies are likely to have social costs that exceed benefits. And, certainly, it can be argued compellingly that a larger proportion of our vast R & D investments should go to such issues as prevention, and behavior and health. Life-styles and social risk factors affect health, longevity, and function far more than those on which the biomedical establishment focuses.
However plausible this position may appear, it has two basic practical weaknesses. First, it is unlikely that our politics will allow it-as evidenced recently by Congress' intimidation of the National Institutes of Health when the NIH decided to phase out its research program on the artificial heart. It is difficult to imagine the American public accepting any policy that reduces our efforts to deal with such diseases of old age as Alzheimers, stroke, cardiovascular disease, and the like. A more serious limitation of this argument is its neglect of the way scientific development proceeds and the dynamics of discovery. Science develops momentum around innovative and exciting ideas and technical developments that allow new options to be pursued, not on the basis of judgments that define what would be the most cost effective or of the greatest social value. Much of the product of science is serendipitous and not easily programmed. We have, of course, waged all-out war on problems such as cancer, but the notable failures of such shotgun approaches in contrast to more orderly scientific development would suggest that we might have considerable difficulty programming future scientific advances to our specifications. , My conclusion, then, is that we will continue to muddle through for decades to come, and that the types of issues addressed here will not have a clear resolution. This perhaps explains my own preference for the balancing of rationing efforts to favor implicit rather than explicit approaches. First, I do not believe that American politics can sensibly come to terms with explicit life and death decisions, made in a vacuum, and not closely tied to the very different values, aspirations, and circumstances brought to bear in clinical situations. I have more trust that health professionals in relationships with patients and their families-~vithin a constrained budget and knowing the contingencies-can make wiser choices than public officials far from the clinical scene. Obviously, government must set the overall rules about equity, access, and budgetary constraints, and must regulate the degree of discretion that takes place. I do not fear the notion of discretion despite the obvious risks of inequities. There is no social institution in America more carefully watched by federal and state agencies, by the Congress and legislatures, by the mass media, and by consumer advocates, than our health care programs. Efforts to make explicit rationing decisions in this country § political environment will inevitably lead to timidity and paralysis. But in an environment of implicit rationing, the characteristic vigilance of our politics may be our strongest protection.
